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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictumn, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
MORE WORDS ON WoRDs
Words are not, as we have thought, merely tools which a craftsman may easily
and artfully wield to serve the purpose of cogent expression. They have taken
on life and grown to such gargantuan proportions, that
The Tripping we have become the slaves of language. That's where our
Tongue semanticists and word-surgeons come in. Like the Greeks,
they have a word, the exact word, for every relation. The
dangerous practice of using words without definite "referents" has led us into
the valley of chaos. This danger and the necessity for the strict disciplining of
words has been recognized by our government, which has availed itself of the
services of prominent semanticists to solve the problem of unruly "referents" in
public affairs. Moley, Business in the Woodshed, SAT. EvE. POST April 6, 1940,
p. 22.
A recent decision illustrates how much work is to be done by our word dis-
ciplinarians in the judicial department of our government as well. The plaintiff
had purchased a herd of cattle which was driven across
Senorita the boundary from Mexico to his ranch in New Mexico;
Elsie Borden the ranch being bonded as a warehouse. A property tax was
levied on the cattle by the State of New Mexico and
plaintiff protested the levy on the ground that, as the cattle had not lost their
status as "imports", they were not subject to state taxation. In support of his
contention the plaintiff urged upon the court the doctrine of the "original package"
created by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
At once the court was confronted with a difficult problem of verbiage. Does the
term "original package" envelop a cow? If so, what were the contents and what
was the package? The court held the term inapplicable to these pastoral peregrina-
tions down Mexico way saying: "Taking a single cow, on the original package
theory, there is no clear cut manner in which to differentiate the cow as the
receptacle from the cow as to its contents. And the cow as the contents of its
own receptacle certainly would not be the same two years after it came to graze
upon the ranch." Tres Ritos Ranch Co. v. Abbott, 44 N. M. 556, 105 P. (2d)
1070 (1940).
The test adopted by the Supreme Court, which received the name "original package
test", was that as long as imported goods remain in the original package and in
the hands of the original consignee, they are still subject to federal regulation. Any
interference by a state violates the "commerce clause" of the Constitution. Southern
Pac. Ca. v. City of Calexico, 288 Fed. 634 (1923); Low v. Austin 13 Wall. 29
(U. S. 1871); City of Galveston v. Mexican Pet. Corp., 15 F. (2d) 208 (1926).
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However, the test appears to have broken down and now it "has ceased to be a
factor in defining the limits imposed upon a state's taxing power by the commerce
clause so far as interstate 'imports' are concerned". ROTTSCHAEBER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1939) 333.
The courts, however, have not been reluctant to apply the test in cases in-
volving interstate commerce where it will effect a just result. In Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105 (1917) the test was so
Unscrambling used. The Western Union Co. in New York supplied
Words messages in code to various stock brokers located in other
states. After arrival at a central point within the state,
the messages were decoded and sent to the individual subscribers. The Public
Service Commission of Massachusetts ordered the plaintiff to cease certain dis-
criminatory practices and the Supreme Court annulled the order holding that the
messages were still in interstate commerce and subject to federal control since
the original package was not broken by a mere decoding at their intermediate
destination. The decoded message was still treated by Justice Holmes as part
of the "original package". A package has been defined as: "First, a receptacle
of whatever form or character, and second, the contents thereof." Mexican Pet.
Corp. v. City of South Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 Ad. 900 (1922).
In the light of the Western Union case we pose the question: if the cows in the
principal case were primarily transported to be used as milking cows, does that
mean that the taking of milk from the cow (or cows)
"Udder" might permit of the treatment of the cows as original
Confusion packages? In the mind's eye a milch cow fulfills the
definition of a package even more so than a telegraphic
jumble. Yet in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935) the fact that milk, shipped
in cans from Vermont, was taken out of the original container and put into bottles
in New York did not permit New York to regulate the minimum prices to be
paid in New York. The milk was still subject to federal control under the
interstate commerce clause.
Despite the holding of the Supreme Court in the Baldwin case, the application
of the original package doctrine to the Tres Ritos Ranch decision would be unsound.
In the former case, Justice Cardozo warned: ". . . the test of the original package
is not an ultimate principle. . . . Formulas and catchwords are subordinate. .. ."
The herd of cows, not milk, was the subject of sale; the herd was permanently
at rest in New Mexico; the state intervention was by way of taxation, not regulation.
American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500 (1904).
As Broom said, long before modern semantics arrived, "He who considers merely
the letter of an instrument goes but skin-deep into its meaning." BRooM's LEGAL
MAxims (10th ed. 1939) 466. This same warning applies to such a formula as
the original package doctrine. In the graphic language of a master of words: "A
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and




TsE "HoTFOOT" COMES TO COURT
Ever popular with practical jokers of the convivial tavern is that effective
non-liquid stimulant, the hotfoot. It is destined to take an honored place
in American folklore. Cf. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF
Western CAPITALISm (1937). For the edification of the younger
Style generation, whose knowledge of the pastime may not ante-
date the era of the safety match, it might be pointed out
that the hotfoot is an old institution, hoary with tradition and varied in its
forms, depending upon the whimsicality and ingenuity of the operator. At the
turn of the century in the lusty West, the approved method of administering it,
was first to saturate with alcohol the pedal extremity of a stupefied patron and
then apply the match. In Curran v. Olsen, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 1124 (1903),
such an alcoholic hotfoot was administered a victim.
Out of the historic Bay State, hard by the Plymouth Rock, came a more stream-
lined technique. The Blue Ribbon Spa is the locus quo of the festivities. A
bartender and another patron "started a little blaze" under
Bay State the foot of a sleeping patron. The victim in this last case
Technique sued the owner of the tavern and the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, after giving weighty deliberation
to the matter, issued a solemn pronouncement that the bartender was acting for a
purpose solely his own not within the scope of his employment and that the
defendant owner was not liable for the consequences of the act. Sullivan v. Crowley,
307 Mass. 189, 29 N. E. (2d) 769 (1940). The court might well have added that
it wasn't cricket either, for participation in the administering of a hotfoot by a
bartender adds an unwelcome touch of professionalism to a pursuit heretofore
purely "amateurish".
As for the law, the general rule that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
apply when a servant commits an assault of a purely personal nature, having no
connection with his duties and not in furtherance of his
"Hotfoot" on a master's business, is in point. Western Union Telegraph
Different Shoe Co. v. Hill, 67 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 5th 1933); Muller v.
Hillenbrand, 227 N. Y. 448, 125 N. E. 808 (1920). How-
ever, in some jurisdictions where the thermal treatment has been the subject of
litigation under circumstances similar to those in the Massachusetts case, a con-
trary view has been taken. In Curran v. Olsen, supra, it was neither the bartender
nor another patron who acted as operator but a cook in a restaurant belonging
to a third party. The alcohol, however, was furnished by the fun-loving and co-
operative bartender who well knew the purpose of the cook's requisition. When
the victim sued, the defendant tavern owner offered the unique defense of con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in falling asleep. The plaintiff,
it seems, had witnessed the cook's dexterity in administering the hotfoot twice
that night to other victims and had, indeed, laughed heartily thereat. That, how-
ever, countered the plaintiff, was a hotfoot on a different shoe and in this the
court concurred. The owner was held liable for negligence in caring for the
safety of the guest.
On a similar set of facts, involving a heat application administered with the
same inodus operandi, the Arkansas court reached a contrary result. Peter Ander-
son & Co. v. Diaz, 77 Ark. 606, 92 S. W. 861 (1906). The court declared that a
saloon-keeper does not hold himself out to the public as a protector of those who
19411
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may be patrons of his saloon and drew a distinction between the liability of a saloon-
keeper and that of a common carrier or innkeeper.
Hot on the heels of Curran v. Olsen and Peter Anderson & Ca. v. Diaz, supra,
came a decision from the State of Washington, involving another unimaginative
bartender whose ingenuity failed to transcend the much overworked alcoholic
hotfoot. Having two precedents before it, the learned court considered both fully
and found for the plaintiff. Here, too, the court viewed the matter from the point
of view of agency, holding that the bartender was the employer's delegated repre-
sentative and that inasmuch as the employer was charged by law with the duty of
preventing disorderly conduct in his establishment, he was liable when the act
was committed by the person whom he had placed in control. Beilke v. Carroll,
51 Wash. 395, 98 Pac. 1119 (1909).
The tavern, it seems, is in need of an Emily Post to formulate a Uniform Law
of Barroom Etiquette or a Blackstone to spell out the Elements of Podiatric Juris-
prudence, for the conflicting decisions are of little help in
A Footless determining the liability of a proprietor who does not live
Formula within a jurisdiction where the "hotfoot" has been litigated.
Bartender, saloon-keeper, patron and victim must, in the
present state of things, learn the hard way.
UP THE LADDER
The line of demarcation between grand and petit larceny has been clear in this
state. It has been a mere matter of arithmetic to discover where the "petit" leaves
off and the "grand" begins. As distinct as the monetary
"Nickel, Nickel, qualification in the law, have been the social differences
Nickel" in their own professional circles, between the petty thief
and the grand "larcener". However, by a recent decision
of the Court of Appeals [People v. Cox, 286 N. Y. 137, 36 N. E. (2d) 84 (1941)]
the social and economic barriers have in certain instances been lowered and the
petty thief may look forward to reception into the more magnificent and munificent
orbit of grand larceny.
The current case held that the nickels taken in a series of thefts by a subway
employee, continuing over a period of about three years, in a number of subway
stations, ranging from Chambers Street to Kingsbridge Road in the Bronx, might
be totaled to make a sum of over $500 and thus support an indictment for grand
larceny, although the daily peculations never amounted to more than 200 nickels.
The court apparently took notice of Benjamin Franklin's adage: "take care of the
nickels and the dollars will take care of themselves."
This is the first decision of this type in this state although in England and in
twenty-five other states the doctrine has often been applied. If the taking is one
transaction, or series of transactions with a common scheme,
Taking or the aggregate value of the property taken is to determine
Tacking the grade of the offense. 32 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 889.
However, in Rex v. Birdseye [4 Car. & P. 386, 172 Eng.
Rep. R. 751 (1830)] the defendant looted a house of its furniture and found the
prospect of carrying off the booty in a single trip too fatiguing. After a first
haul, he returned in two minutes for the second. Then he took half an hour's
[Vol. 10
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respite before returning for the third and final trip. The court held the first and
second trips constituted but a single larceny but the half hour interim broke the
unity and the third trip was considered a separate crime. This of course would
allow a stare decisis-minded felon equipped with Bulova stop watch to empty a
house, by making fresh journeys at half hour intervals with, his in-gotten treasure.
Holmes "bad man" [HoLms, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 171] who kept
informed on the developments in the advance sheets would then never find it
necessary to contemplate any greater crime than petty larceny.
A somewhat similar situation occurred in the case of Flynn v. State, [47 Tex.
Cr. R. 26, 83 S. W. 206 (1904)] where it appeared that the complaining witness,
while inebriated, offered to buy beer for the defendant.
Making Hay The defendant took the witness' roll of bills for the pur-
Slowly pose of paying and each time kept a few bills for himself
until the complainant's capital had dwindled from $85 to
a mere $5. The defendant was convicted of grand larceny despite his modest plea
that he never took more than $50 at one time. An even more brazen defense
was offered by the defendant in the case of State v. Donaldson, [35 Utah 96, 99
Pac. 447 (1909)] who succeeded in fleecing two foreigners (Scotchmen, no less!)
touring the wild and wooly west (at cards). The defense offered to a grand
larceny charge, was that the defendant had to split his winnings with other accom-
plices and he should be charged with stealing only that which he could "rightfully"
keep as his very own. Needless to say he failed to impress the court with his
logic. Had he succeeded felons would undoubtedly try to subtract the cost of
bribery from the amount purloined as overhead expenses. Indeed, that very point
was collaterally made by counsel for the defendant in United States v. Sidlivan, 274
U. S. 259, 264 (1927). Judge Holmes' reply to this impertinence was: ". . . it
will be time enough to consider the question when a taxpayer has the temerity
to raise it." No case has yet been found where a foot pad limited his demand on
his victim to the statutory amount and no more in order to escape a more lengthy
incarceration. Another possibility apparently overlooked is to invite the victim
to stand by until daylight and then to relieve him of his valuables in order to escape
the provisions of the N. Y. PENAL LAW 1294 sub. 1 which states that the taking
of property of any value from the person of another, in the night time, is grand
larceny in the first degree.
A line of decisions involving the theft of gas, electricity, oil and other such
substances is represented by the leading case of Wood v. People [222 Iln. 293,
78 N. E. 607 (1906)] in which the defendant dancing master (even at rest)
managed to keep warm and his gas bill down by the simple expedient of diverting
the gas through a hose before it could be clocked by the meter. The hose would
be disconnected a few days before the representative of the gas company appeared
to read the meter in order to divert suspicion. However, he was apprehended
and charged and convicted of grand larceny despite his plea that on no single
day more than $15 worth of gas was stolen.
This legal amalgamation of a series of transactions into a single transaction may
in some cases meet the layman's sense of justice. Yet such a principle will have
to be developed cautiously if startling results are to be avoided. With respect to
larceny, whether a series of petty larcenies are to be treated as grand larceny, will
to some extent, have to be a question of degree, probably for the court. It would
1941]
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seem that the minimum requirements should be (1) that there be a common victim;
(2) that the property stolen be of a similar kind; (3) that each particular larceny
be effected in a similar manner; and (4) that the thief shall have during the
time when the series of larcenies are being committed an intent to repeat the
criminal act. All these factors should be requisite in addition to the presence
of a common scheme or plan.
